Corporate board decisions in a context of pluralism of interests. A qualitative risk-assessment of corporate law mechanisms dealing with cancellation of board decisions.

The action to declare a company board decision null and void (hereafter 'the action') is a powerful enforcement tool. It allows to sanction a board decision - first and foremost an internal giving - with a sanction that possibly has repercussions outside the internal sphere of a company. On the one hand that is exactly what the concerned action intends to do: it in essence aims to bar the legal effects of a board decision ab initio and erga omnes. That has a potentially vast effect for legal acts based upon the decision involved. On the other hand, that powerful and drastic trait of the action begs for the rights of third parties to be protected, in order to assure legal security.

Consequently, a balance needs to be struck between the interest in having a board decision declared null and void, and the interest in having protection installed against the consequences of annulment. The quest for that balance is the object of the research presented in this dissertation.