Private enforcement of EU competition law: the quantification of damages

The private enforcement of EU competition law is a fascinating and continuously evolving area of law. Articles 101-102 TFEU prohibit companies from, amongst other things, fixing their prices or abusing their dominant position. If they do so anyway, other market players, such as consumers or competing companies, may suffer harm. Those market players are entitled to damages.

For example, suppose you recently bought a new laptop. Afterwards, you read in the media that the European Commission unraveled a price cartel between several laptop manufacturers. Because of that cartel, the prices of the laptops sold were artificially high. You thus paid a higher price for your laptop than you would have paid if the cartel had not taken place. In that case, you are entitled to damages, consisting of the unlawful part of the price you paid for your laptop (and interest).

Despite the intuitive logic behind the private enforcement of competition law, it brings along a plethora of (practical) challenges. One of those challenges is the quantification of damages. In the aforementioned situation, for example, the question arises as to exactly how much you overpaid for your laptop as a result of the cartel.

The research conducted discusses the quantification of damages in detail. It delves into the synergistic interplay between the different economic quantification methods and the applicable rules. It does so in five research stages: (I) the nature and objectives of the European right to damages, (II) the mixed legal-factual concept of harm, (III) the different (advantages and disadvantages of the) economic quantification methods and techniques, (IV) the applicable Belgian rules and a comparison with German, English & Welsh and Dutch law, and (V) the search for a balance between the principle of full compensation and the necessary deviations from that principle (taking into account the research criteria of accuracy and practicality). The research includes some normative considerations, such as the recognition of the deterrent function of the private enforcement of EU competition law and the introduction of an explicit proportionality test when quantifying damages.