Toward a general theory of intuitive and deliberative thinking – testing the corrective assumption of dual process theory in moral and cooperative reasoning

Cooperation is crucial to our own survival in evolutionary settings. Yet, some people are more likely to cooperate than others.  Why is this the case?  Similarly, why do some people decide to behave morally when others do not? Both of these questions have been puzzling scientists and philosophers for thousands of years, and the practical and theoretical implications of their answers are far-reaching.  They are implicated in everything from framing day to day social interactions to supporting judicial and legislative institutions and well beyond. Traditional dual process theory provides an appealing explanation of such questions. It differentiates between two types of reasoning systems, one is fast and intuitive (System 1), while the other is deliberative and demanding (System 2). The theory comes with the “corrective” assumption, that these systems support different types of responses. For example, cooperation is supposed to be fairly intuitive, yet defection is rather deliberative. Hence, if one defects, it presupposes that an individual’s System 2 has overridden her System 1 cooperative intuition. Dual process theory has become widely influential in several domains of thinking research, including cooperation, morality, and logical thinking. However, the corrective assumption has not yet been directly tested empirically in the domains of morality and cooperation.  Hence, the central goal of my proposal is to test its validity and also its generalizability.