Economic liberalism in the global South

Subtitle:government fragmentation, length of mandate, and trade policies

Despite representing more than 75% of the world’s urban population and more than 50% of global GDP, research on comparative and international political economy in the Global South is still scarcer than studies focused on developed countries for the same subfield. Moreover, there is a clear need for further studies in quantitative analysis of domestic institutions and trade. This paper tries to fill these gaps by exploring the effects on trade policies resulting from the interaction between institutionalization (i.e. government fragmentation) and stability (i.e. length of a leader’s survival) in developing countries. In this paper, I argue that an increase in the length of a leader’s mandate mitigates and can eventually reverse the positive effect of government fragmentation on trade liberalization, and vice-versa. This would happen due to two factors. First, more fragmented governments have larger selectorates, more diverse voices, and consequently are more likely to have influential actors increasingly supporting a change in leadership. Second, time in office means power. The longer the leader stays in power, the more influential he or she becomes in relation to the overall government. I find strong empirical evidence for my arguments in cross-sectional time-series models and case studies.

Publication year:2021

Keywords:Minutes and reports

Accessibility:Closed