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Project

New Perspectives on Epistemic Obligation

It is commonplace to say that everyone is entitled to their own opinions. But is that the case? Do we have a right to think whatever we want? Or should we instead conduct our mental lives abiding by a set of distinctive norms? This question has generated a vigorous debate in contemporary epistemology. Prominent voices in the debate hold that the answer to it should be negative: we have an intellectual duty to rid ourselves from irrational beliefs. At the same time, it is increasingly popular to argue that we have no positive intellectual duties. On this view, no intellectual norm concerns the opinions we ought to have, only those we ought not to have. And, so, we can hold each other responsible only for what we believe, not for what we fail to believe. This research project aims to show that this view is wrong: we have some positive intellectual duties, alongside negative ones. Seeking an explanation for this hypothesis, the project advances and defends an unorthodox new theory of intellectual obligation. According to this theory, it is not enough to fit our beliefs with the available evidence, or to put our trust in reliable methods; rather, we ought to believe what maximizes our knowledge and minimizes our ignorance. The project then examines the upshots the theory has and its applications to a set of traditional epistemological problems and paradoxes. Finally, it explores its consequences in the interest of developing a comprehensive theory of intellectual responsibility.

Date:1 Oct 2022 →  Today
Keywords:The ethics of belief, Intellectual responsibility, Epistemic obligation
Disciplines:Epistemology, Logic, Analytical philosophy, Ethical theory