Higher-order quantification in a deontic logic for group obligations.

A standard view on group obligations holds that such obligations are simply collective properties in disguise, i.e. if they hold of a group of agents, it doesn't follow that they also hold of each member of that group. However, I will argue that this standard view is problematic for both empirical and theoretical reasons: group obligations are not just collective properties, conditions occurring in the standard definition are not jointly necessary, and, moreover, they encounter more or less formal objections w.r.t the deontic nature of obligations. I propose a research project at the interface of Philosophical Logic and Moral Philosophy that will address these issues. The central hypothesis that I will support throughout my project is that a closer look at the mereological properties of groups will lead to a proper understanding of these group obligations. My project will have three main original contributions. Its first contribution will be a class of concepts for group obligations. Its second contribution will be a study of the connection between mereological and normative concepts. Its third contribution will be the definition of a higher-order deontic logic for group obligations. My project will successfully address the issues encountered by the current standard definition of group obligations and will provide new insights on group obligations that will be useful both to logicians and moral philosophers.

Keywords:ETHICS

Disciplines:Philosophy of language, Analytical philosophy, Ethics not elsewhere classified