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Project

Agentive Modality and the Structure of Modal Knowledge

The topic of my PhD research is the epistemology of modality, that is, the study of knowledge (and more broadly, justified belief) about what is possible, necessary, impossible and contingent. Interest in the field comes from its relevance for the methodology of philosophy itself, where modal claims are often used as premises in arguments or as presuppositions. For example, this happens in the development of thought experiments. Accordingly, the focus has been on knowledge of non-actual metaphysical (non-ordinary, substantive) possibility. A recent approach to this question, explored by Williamson (2007) and Vetter (2016), tries to give an account of knowledge of metaphysical modality in terms of generalizations from ordinary 'entry-points'. Williamson stresses the role of imagination in the assessment of ordinary counterfactuals, and explains knowledge of metaphysical modality as a limiting case of the former. Vetter replaces knowledge of counterfactuals with knowledge of capacities and abilities, and explains knowledge of metaphysical modality in terms of a process of abstraction from concrete cases. In this research, I examine the general viability of this strategy, and independently explore the epistemological, logical, and metaphysical issues concerning knowledge of counterfactuals, abilities, and other related classes of judgment

Date:15 Jan 2017 →  5 Jan 2021
Keywords:Epistemology
Disciplines:Analytical philosophy, Epistemology
Project type:PhD project