Rosenkranz's Logic of Justification and unprovability

Rosenkranz has recently proposed a logic for propositional, non-factive, all-things-considered justification, which is based on a logic for the notion of being in a position to know (The Structure of Justification, Mind, 127(506), 309-338). Starting from three quite weak assumptions in addition to some of the core principles that are already accepted by Rosenkranz, I prove that, if one has positive introspective and modally robust knowledge of the axioms of minimal arithmetic, then one is in a position to know that a sentence is not provable in minimal arithmetic or that the negation of that sentence is not provable in minimal arithmetic. This serves as the formal background for an example that calls into question the correctness of Rosenkranz's logic of justification.

Jaar van publicatie:2020

BOF-keylabel:ja

IOF-keylabel:ja

CSS-citation score:1

Authors from:Higher Education

Toegankelijkheid:Open