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Responsibility for Climate Justice

Boek - Dissertatie

Whether it is the car we drive, the animal products we consume or the electricity we use, most of our day-to-day actions contribute to one of the gravest injustices of our time: the destruction of the climate. This thesis asks the question how individuals should respond to this injustice. More specifically, this thesis is my response to two puzzles. The first is the problem of collective harm: given that individuals do not seem to make a difference to the outcome, why would they have a reason to take action against climate disruption? The second puzzle concerns the nature of an individual's climate responsibilities. Should she reduce her footprint? Advocate for political change? Or both? In search for answers, I explore the contemporary debate on climate ethics. I argue that the most important consequentialist, causation-based and non-consequentialist approaches are unsatisfactory. Not only do they face difficulties solving the problem of collective harm, but they tell stories about climate responsibilities that are implausibly narrow in scope. They zoom in on the consequences of an individual's emissions, on her causal role within the climate system, or on the importance of green character traits. In the process, they neglect the relation between the individual and the structural processes that are at the heart of climate injustice. In this thesis, I argue that we should look at the bigger picture. I conceptualise climate responsibilities through an intersectional feminist interpretation of Iris Marion Young's social connection model. This model acknowledges that climate injustice is not an interactional but a structural wrong, brought about by socio-structural processes that are ingrained within our society. The model does not zoom in on individuals taken in isolation, but brings into view their position within these processes. My interpretation of the social connection model helps solve both puzzles. It shows that individuals have a moral reason to act against climate disruption because they are a part of the structural processes that produce this injustice. And it shows that their responsibilities are threefold: they ought to join others in collective action, they should advocate for inclusive change, and they must reduce their personal contribution to climate disruption. Personal responsibilities are always secondary to political action, however, for climate justice first and foremost requires structural change.
Jaar van publicatie:2021
Toegankelijkheid:Closed