K afektivnemu razumevanju čistih sodb okusa

Subtitle:Towards an affective understanding of pure judgments of taste

Abstract:In this article, it is suggested that ‘affect’ should be an important notion in political philosophy. We do this, firstly, by tracing the notion of affect through the philosophical system of Immanuel Kant. We find that this notion plays a threefold role for Kant, which can be mapped onto Hannah Arendt’s distinction between natural humanity, moral humanity, and political/aesthetic humanity (our rephrasing). It clearly plays a role on the level of natural humanity, and it is arguably to be pinpointed from within moral humanity. With regard to political/aesthetic humanity, we argue that in order to appreciate how pure judgments of taste can vouch for the ‘bridging’ of the gap between natural and moral humanity, an examination of the role of aesthetic affectation is essential. Secondly, we broaden the Kantian scope of affect by discussing how Slavoj Žižek, in the wake of Jacques Lacan, has tried (but failed) to systematically examine the political relevance of pure judgments of taste. To understand how humans are able to come together politically, we need to recognize affect as that which allows pure form to effectuate a subjectively but universally shareable proclivity for (dis)pleasure and desire.

Publication year:2024

Accessibility:Open