The permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) of the European Union : means, ways, ends and tempo

Abstract:This doctoral research devoted entirely to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) of the European Union aims to answer two fundamental questions: 1) Is PESCO, as designed, the right tool to meet the defence aspirations of the European Union, the Member States and the European defence industry; and 2) Is the European Union, thanks to PESCO, closer to achieving the longed-for "Strategic Autonomy"? The analysis of hundreds of written sources, the dozens of interviews conducted and the countless conversations held with various experts in the framework of events or informal talks have enabled the researcher not only to answer the research questions, but also to determine the precise reasons why: 1) PESCO, as it has been designed, is not the right tool to satisfy the aspirations of the three actors involved in PESCO. That is, the European Union, the Member States, and the defence industry; and 2) the European Union is not, thanks to PESCO, any closer to achieving the desired "Strategic Autonomy". In order to reach these conclusions, the dissertation is divided into four parts, paying attention to the various elements to be studied in relation to PESCO and its objectives in terms of whether they were "means", "ways" or "ends". It was also decided to introduce a fourth component, "tempo", because if the results pursued through both the more binding commitments set out in PESCO and its projects do not arrive in a timely manner, the usefulness of the tool will be more than questionable. In this way, the historical background of PESCO and the political context in which it was conceived and launched, as well as its relationship with the rest of the defence initiatives launched by the European Union, with special emphasis on those established from 2016 onwards, have been explored. Secondly, the regulatory issue has been addressed, analysing the institutional architecture of PESCO and the implications of its laxity and ambiguity, which allow PESCO to be used for a purpose other than its original purpose. Subsequently, the relationship between PESCO and the European defence industry has been analysed, as it is an actor with an extremely important capacity to influence States, in such a way that the interests of the sector end up prevailing over other considerations. To this end, not only have the industrial dynamics and the characteristics of the companies that make up the sector been taken into account, but also the factors that conditioned and/or facilitated the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA). In relation to the above, the connection between PESCO and the European Defence Fund (EDF) has also been examined in depth, insofar as it is the mechanism through which the entities - and, as a consequence, the Member States - end up influencing PESCO. A reality that can be felt in the way in which the tool has moved away from its initial objectives (to bring the EU closer to "Strategic Autonomy"), to end up being a means through which States seek to guarantee the survival of their national defence industry. In addition, and linked to this, the issue of funding has also been addressed, highlighting the lack of transparency and the scarce information available in this regard, all of which impedes the proper accountability and scrutiny of PESCO. The analysis of all these aspects has allowed the author to conclude, moreover, that the necessary alignment and coherence between the different defence initiatives implemented by the EU is lacking, for which concrete examples are provided. Moreover, this research demonstrates that it is the alliance between States and industry - two actors that pursue different objectives from those of the European Union - that ultimately determines the direction of PESCO. Also, the current state of affairs is largely due to external factors. As NATO has regained much of its raison d'être - especially as the threat posed by Russia has grown - Member States' incentives to cooperate within the EU framework have diminished. This has meant that a tool such as PESCO, designed to provide the EU with a "coherent full spectrum force package", has been overshadowed, becoming useful only insofar as it allows participating States to nurture their industry. All of which is further illustrated by an interesting theoretical exercise that serves to demonstrate how the distribution in projects has ended up being driven by the "real weight" of each state within PESCO above all other considerations; all of which corroborates the idea that it serves the states and their industry and not the EU as a whole. Based on the above, it has been addressed the ends of PESCO, i.e. "Strategic Autonomy" and how a term that was never properly defined has been mutating according to needs and context, until it has been diluted in parallel with the original objectives of PESCO. It also shows how the problems identified during the research affect the results offered by PESCO. Moreover, it is noted how the failure of this tool only increases the military and industrial differential between the EU and its competitors. Finally, thanks to the analysis of the different design faults, the triple rationale of the actors involved and other factors that have been analysed in depth throughout this research, it has been possible to offer a series of recommendations in the framework of the second Strategic Review of PESCO that will allow policy-makers to bring this tool closer to its initial objectives. Keywords: PESCO, EU Defence, CSDP, Defence Industry, EDF, Strategic Autonomy, NATO

Publication year:2024

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