The spending behaviour of the European political parties (2004-2016)

In his State of the Union speech in 2017, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker announced new funding rules for European political parties and foundations. This dissertation focuses on this revision of the regulatory framework, which was completed in 2018. The main objective is to explain this change of the rules, both regarding timing and content.

After a general introduction in the first chapter of the dissertation, chapter two contains a general overview of the funding regime for European political parties and foundations. The main rationale and the process that led up to the introduction of EU public funding in 2004 is described. Furthermore, the multi-level regulatory framework is set out: the different rules that the parties and foundations must adhere to and how these provisions have been changed during the revisions of 2007, 2014 and 2018.

Chapter three starts with laying out the analyticist ontological and epistemological foundations of the dissertation. An holistic, case-centric approach is applied, aimed at providing a comprehensive explanation for the revision of the rules. The chapter continues with a description of the analytical and theoretical framework. An actor-centred institutionalist perspective is taken, which is focused on the interactions of intentional political actors that are enabled and constrained by the institutional context. Based on existing studies on party funding and European political parties, a theoretical model is developed to guide the empirical analysis.

The fourth chapter sets out the research methodology and data collection. As a methodological tool, explaining-outcome process-tracing is used to identify the main factors and contextual conditions that have led to the revision of the regulatory framework. The analysis is based on a wide array of data sources: financial accounts, legislative and budgetary documents, meeting minutes and internal notes, press statements and news articles, semi-structured interviews and field research.

Chapter five contains the first of three analytical chapters. It focuses on the income of European political parties: it examines how the total funding sums for European political parties and foundations are determined and how the European subsidies are related to the other income of the Europarties and Eurofoundations. It shows that the rising public subsidies have led to internal budgetary pressure for the European political parties and foundations.

Chapter six deals with the way Eurosceptic national parties have responded (to the introduction of) public Europarty funding. It shows how they have changed their position from principled opposition to strategic involvement in the Europarty system, and how (mainly) radical right parties have instrumentalized European political parties to maximize their income.

Chapter seven shows how the developments of the two previous chapters have led to pressure from the main European political parties to revise the funding rules, and analyses the decision-making process.

Finally, chapter eight contains the conclusions. A summary of the main findings of the analysis and an examination of the main consequences of the 2018 revision of the funding rules is given. The findings are assessed in light of the analytical and theoretical framework. Furthermore, a more normative assessment is given, with suggestions for changes to the existing regulatory framework. Finally, a number of possible avenues for future research are outlined.