Cryptanalysis of post-quantum cryptosystems

A quantum computer exploits quantum-mechanical effects such as superposition to solve hard mathematical problems that are intractable on classical computers.  The most prominent example is Shor's algorithm that renders all widely deployed cryptographic systems such as RSA or ECDSA insecure. Post-quantum cryptography deals with the design and analysis of cryptographic algorithms that remain secure against attacks by quantum computers. Recently, NIST launched a call for post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for new public-key cryptographic standards. This research proposal aims to develop cryptanalytical machinery to analyze the security of post-quantum cryptography with particular focus on (but not limited to) the proposals submitted to the NIST PQC competition. The project uses a natural two-pronged approach that bridges the gap between theoretical proposals and deployed systems. The first prong is algorithmic and uses theoretical tools from number theory and algebraic geometry to develop algorithms to solve the underlying hard problems, exploiting either extra mathematical structure or the use of overly aggressive parameter choices. The second prong evaluates implementation security by exploiting physical leakage or faults and develops effective countermeasures for these side-channel attacks.

Keywords:Post-quantum cryptography, Cryptanalysis, Side-channel security, Quantum computer, Computational number theory

Disciplines:Modelling, Multimedia processing, Communications, Communications technology, Applied mathematics in specific fields, Computer architecture and networks, Distributed computing, Information sciences, Information systems, Programming languages, Scientific computing, Theoretical computer science, Visual computing, Other information and computing sciences, Algebra