Like Wondering at a Tautology

Ondertitel:Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics

Korte inhoud:The aim of this paper is to clarify the central role played by Wittgenstein’s conception of logical impossibility in his 1929 “Lecture on Ethics” (1965). This will be done in reference to Chapters 26 and 29 of the Big Typescript, where Wittgenstein reflected extensively on the role of imagination as a means to determine the sense or senselessness of a proposition and the logical (im)possibility of a state of affairs. To that end, I will first provide an account of the difference Wittgenstein observed between logical and physical impossibility. I will subsequently clarify the role of imagination in relation to sense and logical impossibility. And lastly, I will argue, against this backdrop, that Wittgenstein’s insistence on the nonsensicality of both meaningful ethical propositions and absolute or ethical facts, should, first and foremost, be understood as a result of their logical and not merely their physical impossibility. And, additionally, that he conceived absolute experiences to be ‘absolute’ in virtue of their logical impossibility.

ISBN:9783950551211

Jaar van publicatie:2023

Trefwoorden:Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ethics, Logic, Modality, Middle Wittgenstein, A Lecture on Ethics (1929)

Toegankelijkheid:Open